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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________
No 12-CV-3475 (JFB) (ARL)
_____________________

LISA ZALTZ,
Plaintiff,
VERSUS

JDATE,
Defendant.
___________________
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
July 8, 2013
___________________

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:
Pro se plaintiff Lisa Zaltz (“plaintiff” or
“Zaltz”) brought this action for breach of
contract, personal injury, and fraud against
JDATE
(“defendant”
or
“Sparks
Networks”).1 Specifically, plaintiff alleges,
among other things, that defendant billed her
repeatedly for months without her
knowledge or consent. Plaintiff claims that,
despite her complaints about the fees, the
problem was not remedied. Plaintiff also
claims that she was eventually removed
from the website altogether. Moreover,
plaintiff alleges that she has received prank
1

Although plaintiff named JDATE as the defendant
in the caption of this case, the proper defendant is
Sparks Networks USA, LLC (“Sparks Networks”),
the owner and operator of JDate.com, a popular
dating website. Sparks Networks has appeared in this
action, and filed the motion to dismiss or to transfer
that is presently before the Court. The Court,
therefore, directs the Clerk of the Court to modify the
caption of this case accordingly.

calls from the website, and that her personal
page on the website has been hacked.
Defendant has moved, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), to
dismiss the action for improper venue or, in
the alternative, to transfer the action,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),2 to the
2

In connection with its transfer motion, defendant
cites both 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and § 1406(a). Section
1404(a) allows a court to transfer a case, even if the
venue is proper, to any other district or division
where it might have been brought “[f]or the
convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section
1406(a), on the other hand, permits a district court to
transfer a case, “if it be in the interest of justice,”
when the venue is improper. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Thus, determining whether defendant’s transfer
motion is more appropriately brought pursuant to
Section 1404(a) or 1406(a) depends on whether
venue in New York is proper or improper. “The
presence of a forum selection clause does not enter
into this analysis,” GMAC Commer. Credit v. Dillard
Dep’t Stores, 198 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see
also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,
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United States District Court for the Central
District of California. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court grants defendant’s
motion to transfer and the action is
transferred to the Central District of
California.

28 n.8 (1988) (“Congress’ determination of where
venue lies cannot be trumped by private contract and
[], therefore, a forum selection clause cannot render
venue improper in a district if venue is proper in that
district under federal law.” (citation and quotation
marks omitted)), “[r]ather, venue is determined by
statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1391,” GMAC Commer. Credit,
198 F.R.D. at 405. Section 1391 provides that a civil
action may be brought in “(1) a judicial district in
which any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred
. . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action
may otherwise be brought as provided in this section,
any judicial district in which any defendant is subject
to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to
such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
In her complaint, plaintiff alleges that she was
improperly billed on a monthly basis, received prank
phone calls, and was sexually assaulted on a date.
(Compl.) Construing these allegations in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, a substantial part of the
events that gave rise to plaintiff’s claims in this
lawsuit occurred in the Eastern District of New York
(as plaintiff is a resident of Lawrence, New York, and
therefore received the bills, the calls, and went on the
date where she was allegedly sexually assaulted in
the area). See, e.g., Reyes v. Reyes, 11-CV-2536
(KAM)(LB), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131659, at *1719 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2012) (stating that “venue
may be appropriate in a given district even if a
greater portion of events occurred elsewhere,” and
concluding that when all inferences are construed in
pro se plaintiff’s favor, she alleged facts sufficient to
show that the district in which she filed bore a
“substantial connection” to her litigation (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Daniel v. Am.
Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 432 (2d Cir.
2005) (explaining that venue is not restricted to the
district in which the “most substantial” events or
omissions giving rise to a claim occurred, but that
venue can be appropriate in multiple jurisdictions, so
long as a “substantial part” of the underlying events
took place in those districts). Venue in this District
would therefore be proper under Section 1391(b)(2).
Even if a substantial part of the events giving
rise to this lawsuit were not deemed to have occurred
in this District, venue would be proper under Section
1391(b)(3). Under the venue statute, when the
defendant is a corporation, it “shall be deemed to
reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is

In particular, the Court finds that the
contract at issue contained a presumptively
enforceable forum selection clause wherein
commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). Thus, whether
or not venue in this District is proper under Section
1391(b)(3) depends on whether defendant was within
this Court’s personal jurisdiction at the time the
action was initiated. Courts in this District have held
that websites like JDate.com – interactive websites
that have a commercial component – can
purposefully avail themselves of jurisdiction in a
state when they make sales to customers in that state.
Compare ICG Am., Inc. v. Wine of the Month Club,
Inc., No. 3:09-cv-133(PCD), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77151, at *18-19 (D. Conn. Aug. 28, 2008)
(“Defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of doing business in Connecticut. Its
interactive, commercial website invites consumers
from any state, including Connecticut, to purchase its
products.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)), and Nat’l Football League v. Miller, No.
99 Civ. 11846 (JSM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3929,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (noting that mere
maintenance of a website visited by people in New
York does not confer personal jurisdiction in New
York, but finding purposeful availment because
website directly profited from plaintiffs in New
York), with Capitol Records, LLC v. VideoEgg, Inc.,
611 F. Supp. 2d 349, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(explaining that a defendant that “neither sells goods
or services through its website nor charges
membership fees to its registered users” does not
conduct traditional business over the Internet for
purposes of personal jurisdiction). Thus, because
defendant charged membership fees to JDate.com to
customers in New York, it can be said to have
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in New York. Accordingly, venue here
would be proper under Section 1391(b)(3) if not
under Section 1391(b)(2).
Because the Court concludes, without having
considered the forum selection clause at issue, that
venue would be proper in this District, the Court
analyzes defendant’s transfer motion under Section
1404(a).

2
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California, a balancing of the relevant
factors weighs in favor of transfer, and the
interests of justice are served by transfer in
these circumstances, the Court, in the
exercise of its discretion, grants defendant’s
motion to transfer this case.3

the parties agreed to litigate any claims
arising from defendant’s website in the State
of California, City of Los Angeles. Although
plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that
she does not believe that she agreed to such
a forum selection clause, the evidence
suggests that she, in fact, did. A declaration
filed by a Spark Networks employee,
screenshots submitted by defendant, and
JDate.com’s current website all demonstrate
that plaintiff could not have signed up to
participate on the site without agreeing to its
terms and conditions, which included the
California forum selection clause. Plaintiff
has submitted no evidence to controvert
these facts. By affirmatively accepting the
terms and conditions of use, plaintiff agreed
to be bound by all of the terms contained
therein, including the forum selection
clause, even if she did not take the time to
read through the terms and conditions in
their entirety before denoting her
acceptance. Moreover, plaintiff does not
allege any facts that would make the
enforcement of that clause unreasonable or
unjust, nor does she allege facts from which
this Court could conclude that the clause is
invalid. Accordingly, defendant’s California
forum selection clause is valid and
enforceable.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
The complaint alleges that defendant, in
connection with its website JDate.com,
billed plaintiff repeatedly for months
without her consent or knowledge.
(Compl.)4 According to the complaint,
plaintiff complained about the improper
billing, but no changes were made. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that defendant instead
“threw [her] off the site.” (Id.)
Additionally, plaintiff alleges that she
has “been receiving prank [and] sexual calls
from the website.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that
she went to the police about those calls, but
was told that the names of the callers could
not be obtained. (Id.) The complaint further
alleges that plaintiff was sexually assaulted
by a member of the website while they were
on a date, and that she has “experienced a lot
of hacking” into her personal page on
defendant’s website. (Id.)

In addition, the other discretionary
factors courts consider in determining
whether to transfer venue weigh strongly in
favor of transfer in this case. For example,
the locus of operative facts in this action lies
within central California, and central
California is the site of many of the
documents and witnesses relevant to this
case. Moreover, plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that litigating this case in
California, as opposed to New York, would
be inconvenient, or that she would be
financially prejudiced by such a transfer.
Because this action could have appropriately
been brought in the Central District of

B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in New York
State Supreme Court, Nassau County, on
May 25, 2012. Defendant removed the case
3

As discussed in detail infra, because the Court, in its
discretion, concludes that transfer is the appropriate
remedy, the Court elects to transfer the case to the
Central District of California pursuant to Section
1404(a), rather than to dismiss the case pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
4
Because plaintiff’s complaint is a single page, the
Court refers to the complaint without page numbers.

3
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(“TradeComet.com LLC I”), 693 F. Supp. 2d
370, 375 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining
that a court, in deciding a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(3), “may consider evidentiary matters
outside the pleadings, by affidavit or
otherwise, regarding the existence of
jurisdiction” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).

to this Court on July 13, 2012. On August
30, 2012, defendant filed a motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for improper
venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the
case to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California. By Order
dated November 28, 2012, the Court
directed plaintiff to respond to defendant’s
motion to dismiss. Plaintiff subsequently
filed a letter in opposition to defendant’s
motion, dated January 1, 2013. Defendant
filed its reply in further support of its motion
on January 17, 2013. The Court has fully
considered the submissions of the parties.

If there are disputed facts relevant to the
venue determination, it may be appropriate
for the district court to hold an evidentiary
hearing, where the plaintiff must
demonstrate venue by a preponderance of
the evidence, before resolving the Rule
12(b)(3) motion. See New Moon Shipping
Co., Ltd. v. MAN B&W Diesel AG, 121 F.3d
24, 29 (2d Cir. 1997) (“A disputed fact may
be resolved in a manner adverse to the
plaintiff only after an evidentiary hearing . .
. no disputed fact should be resolved against
[the resisting] party until it has had an
opportunity to be heard.” (citations
omitted)); see also Murphy v. Schneider
Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir.
2004) (“To resolve such motions when
genuine factual issues are raised, it may be
appropriate for the district court to hold a
Rule 12(b)(3) motion in abeyance until the
district court holds an evidentiary hearing on
the disputed facts. Whether to hold a hearing
on disputed facts and the scope and method
of the hearing is within the sound discretion
of the district court.” (citations omitted)).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(b)(3) Motions
Enforcement of a forum selection clause
is an appropriate basis for a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See
TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc.
(“TradeComet.com LLC II”), 647 F.3d 472,
478 (2d Cir. 2011). To survive a Rule
12(b)(3) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has
the burden of pleading venue. See Cold
Spring Harbor Lab. v. Ropes & Gray LLP,
762 F. Supp. 2d 543, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
If the court relies only on pleadings and
affidavits, the plaintiff need only make a
prima facie showing of venue. See Gulf Ins.
Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 355 (2d
Cir. 2005). Thus, if an evidentiary hearing
on the question of venue has not been held,
“the Court accepts facts alleged in the
complaint as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in [plaintiff’s] favor.” Person v.
Google Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 488, 493
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Caremark
Therapeutic Servs. v. Leavitt, 405 F. Supp.
2d 454, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). The Court is
permitted, however, to consider facts outside
of the pleadings on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion.
See TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc.

As set forth in detail below, even
assuming that plaintiff’s facts are true, and
drawing all inferences in plaintiff’s favor,
the Court concludes that the contract
between the parties contains a valid and
enforceable forum selection clause in which
plaintiff agreed to litigate the claims in the
instant lawsuit in the State of California,
City of Los Angeles. Because plaintiff has
alleged no facts that would provide grounds
4
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to invalidate that forum selection clause,
discovery and/or an evidentiary hearing on
this issue is unnecessary.5

B. Section 1404(a) Motions
Rather than dismiss an action due to the
existence of a valid and enforceable forum
selection clause, a court may exercise its

5

In other cases, this Court has held evidentiary
hearings to determine whether a plaintiff assented to
a forum selection clause in connection with a website
purchase. See, e.g., Scherillo v. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Novak v.
Tucows, Inc., No. 06-CV-1909 (JFB)(ARL), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21269 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007).
The Court also has carefully considered whether an
evidentiary hearing is necessary based upon the
record before it and concludes that such a hearing is
unwarranted under the particular circumstances in
this case. As a threshold matter, plaintiff did not
request an evidentiary hearing and, thus, any such
request is waived. See, e.g., TradeComet.com LLC II,
647 F.3d at 33 (holding that plaintiff had forfeited
right to any evidentiary hearing on forum selection
clause by failing to seek it). Second, in order to
trigger an evidentiary hearing, a party must submit
evidence creating a genuine issue of disputed fact
that requires resolution by the Court. Here, as
discussed infra, defendant has submitted thorough
evidence – including sworn statements and exhibits
from the website – demonstrating, inter alia, that
plaintiff was expressly required to click a specific
box to accept the Terms of Service (which included
the forum selection clause) in order to utilize the
online personals and social introduction services
available from JDate.com, and plaintiff was required
to acknowledge her acceptance of the Terms of
Service each time she submitted credit card
information to cover monthly subscription fees for
the website. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence, by
affidavit or otherwise, to controvert this evidence in
any way. Instead, plaintiff’s one-page, unsworn
opposition letter simply states, in a conclusory
fashion, that plaintiff does not remember what was
included in the Terms of Service, and speculates
(without any evidence) that maybe defendant
amended the terms. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.
(“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1 (“I don’t recall the terms of
service to have been what I signed up with and it
clearly states that they amend them. I don’t believe
these are the same terms I signed up with. I don’t
believe that I agreed to any terms stating that I have
to sue within California if an issue arises.”).)
However, defendant has provided a sworn statement
from its North American Director of Customer
Support that the “Terms of Service were applicable to
all subscribers of Spark Networks’ website at

JDate.com and no material changes were made
thereto during all four periods where Ms. Zaltz was a
subscriber of Spark’s website at JDate.com” and the
forum selection clause at issue was part of those
Terms of Service and “remained unchanged during
Ms. Zaltz’s subscription to JDate.com.” (Decl. of
Steve Burton in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. (“Burton
Decl.”) ¶ 4.) Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to
controvert defendant’s evidence on this issue or any
other issue, and thus no evidentiary hearing is
warranted. See TradeComet.com LLC II, 647 F.3d at
33 (“We conclude . . . that TradeComet failed to raise
any material issue of fact as to Google’s
communication of the terms of the August 2006
agreement that required an evidentiary hearing.”); see
also Hancock v. Am. Telephone and Telegraph, Inc.,
701 F.3d 1248, 1265 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Because
Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine factual dispute
regarding acceptance of the U-verse terms at the
point of installation, the district court did not err in
denying an evidentiary hearing.”); Magi XXI, Inc. v.
Stato Della Citta Del Vaticano, 818 F. Supp. 2d 597,
610 n.14 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Even taking as true all
facts submitted by plaintiff, and viewing all facts in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds
that plaintiff has not carried its heavy burden of
rebutting the presumption of enforceability of the
forum selection clauses. Thus, it is unnecessary to
hold an evidentiary hearing.”); Gamayo v. Match.com
LLC, Nos. C11-00762 SBA, C 11-1076 SBA, C 111206 SBA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95914, at *21
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) (“Since there are no
factual disputes that bear upon whether the forum
selection clause should be enforced, Plaintiff’s
request for an evidentiary hearing is denied.”);
Universal Grading Serv. v. eBay, Inc., 08-CV-3557
(CPS), 2009 WL 2029796, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. June 10,
2009) (“Accordingly, because there is no dispute that
persons or entities desiring to become eBay users are
required to assent to the User Agreement in force at
the time, and because plaintiff Callandrello alleges
that he became an eBay user, and does not dispute
eBay’s allegation that he became an eBay user in
2005, when the 2003 User Agreement was in force, I
conclude without need for an evidentiary hearing that
the forum selection clause contained in the 2003 User
Agreement was reasonably communicated to plaintiff
Callandrello.” (internal citation omitted)).

5
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subscriber” and she had to agree to the
Terms of Service each time she renewed her
membership. (Id. at 5-6.) As discussed in
detail below, because the uncontroverted
evidence demonstrates that defendant’s
mandatory forum selection clause was
reasonably communicated to plaintiff, and
plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden of
showing that enforcement of the clause
would be either unreasonable or unjust, the
Court finds defendant’s clause – requiring
claims to be brought in the State of
California, City of Los Angeles – to be valid
and enforceable.

discretionary power to transfer the action
“[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . to any
district or division in which it could have
been brought,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). “[M]otions for transfer lie within
the broad discretion of the district court and
are determined upon notions of convenience
and fairness on a case-by-case basis.” In re
Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d 110, 117
(2d Cir. 1992) (citing Stewart Org., Inc., 487
U.S. at 29). The burden of demonstrating
that the action should be transferred to
another district lies with the moving party,
D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95
106 (2d Cir. 2006), and the plaintiff’s choice
of forum “should not be disturbed unless the
balance of factors tips decidedly in favor of
a transfer,” Wildwood Imps. v. M/V Zim
Shanghai, No. 04-CV-5538, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2736, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
2005); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981) (explaining
that there generally is “a strong presumption
in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum”).

1. Applicable Law
Under the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., forum selection clauses are
prima facie valid and should control
questions of venue absent a “strong
showing” that enforcement would be
“unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause
was invalid for such reasons as fraud or
over-reaching.” 407 U.S. 1, 10, 15 (1972).
The Supreme Court has also stated that a
forum selection clause can bind the parties
even where the agreement in question is a
form consumer contract that is not subject to
negotiation. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991).
Forum selection clause language must,
however, be mandatory to be enforced. John
Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A. v.
Attiki Importers & Distribs., 22 F.3d 51, 5253 (2d Cir. 1994); Cent. Nat’l Gottesman,
Inc. v. M.V. “Gertrude Oldendorff,” 204 F.
Supp. 2d 675, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“For a
forum selection clause to be deemed
mandatory, jurisdiction and venue must be
specified with mandatory or exclusive
language.” (citation omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Whether Defendant’s Forum Selection
Clause is Valid and Enforceable
Defendant’s argument that venue in the
Eastern District of New York is improper is
based on the forum selection clause
contained within the Terms of Service of its
website, JDate.com. That clause provides
that all claims arising out of or related to the
website will be litigated in the state or
federal courts of California, City of Los
Angeles. (See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp.
of Mot. to Dismiss or Transfer (“Def.’s
Mot.”) at 8.) Defendant contends that
plaintiff explicitly agreed to be bound by the
clause because, like all subscribers to the
website, she was “required to formally
accept the Terms of Service to become a

The Second Circuit has developed a
framework to determine the validity of
6
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State of California, City of Los
Angeles with regard to any and all
claims by you arising out of or
related to the website. This
Agreement shall not be governed by
the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, the application of which is
hereby expressly excluded.

forum selection clauses in the context of
motions to dismiss. Under this framework, a
clause is “presumptively enforceable” if the
moving party can demonstrate the
following: (1) the clause was reasonably
communicated to the party challenging
enforcement; (2) the clause is mandatory
rather than permissive in nature; and (3) the
claims involved are subject to the clause.
See Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d
378, 383 (2d Cir. 2007). The burden then
shifts to the non-moving party who, to
overcome the presumption of enforceability,
must make a “sufficiently strong showing
that ‘enforcement would be unreasonable or
unjust, or that the clause was invalid for
such reasons as fraud or overreaching.’” Id.
at 383-84 (quoting M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at
15); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, 499
U.S. at 591-92 (finding that plaintiffs failed
to satisfy the “heavy burden of proof”
required
to
invalidate
clause
for
“inconvenience”). Whether the resisting
party has rebutted the presumption of
enforceability is a question of federal law.
See Phillips, 494 F.3d at 384 (“Despite the
presumptive validity of choice of law
clauses, our precedent indicates that federal
law should be used to determine whether an
otherwise mandatory and applicable forum
clause is enforceable under . . . [the final]
step [] in our analysis.”).

(Burton Decl. Ex. A, Terms and Conditions
of Service, at 8.) In regard to this clause,
plaintiff states the following: (1) “I don’t
recall the terms of service to have been what
I signed up with”; (2) “I don’t believe these
are the same terms I signed up with”; and
(3) “I don’t believe that I agreed to any
terms stating that I have to sue within
California if an issue arises.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at
1.) The fact that plaintiff cannot remember
the terms that she was presented with when
she joined, or that she simply does not
believe that she agreed to suit in California,
does not negate the uncontroverted and
overwhelming evidence demonstrating that
plaintiff could not have become a member
of JDate.com without first agreeing to the
website’s Terms of Service, which included
the forum selection clause.
In a declaration in support of defendant’s
motion to dismiss or transfer, Steve Burton,
defendant’s Director of Customer Support
for North America, explained the
membership process for subscribers of
JDate.com. In order to join JDate.com, a
user is required to “click on a specific box to
accept the Terms of Service. . . . There is a
check box which the prospective member is
required to click on confirming that he or
she has read and agreed to the Terms of
Service and which features a hyperlink to a
webpage displaying the Terms of Service.”
(Burton Decl. ¶ 5.) Those Terms of Service
include the forum selection clause quoted
above. (Id. Ex. A, at 8.) In addition, a

2. Analysis
The forum selection clause contained
within defendant’s Terms of Service on its
website, JDate.com, provides as follows:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: This
Agreement is governed by the laws
of the State of California without
regard to its conflict of law
provisions. You agree to personal
jurisdiction by and exclusive venue
in the state and federal courts of the
7
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2012) (explaining that declarations filed by
defendant’s employees, screenshots of
defendant’s website, and defendant’s current
website indicate that potential members
must agree to the website’s terms of service,
which included a forum selection clause, in
order to join the site, thereby negating the
force of plaintiff’s argument that he does not
remember agreeing to the website’s forum
selection clause when he joined).

JDate.com member is required to accept the
Terms and Conditions of Purchase (which
incorporate and specifically reference the
Terms of Service) each time he or she
submits payment information to cover
monthly subscription fees. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Notably, plaintiff does not dispute that
the process described by Burton was in
place both when she joined the website and
each time that she renewed her membership.
Plaintiff does not even dispute having read
or agreed to certain terms of service before
signing up for the website or renewing her
membership. Instead, plaintiff states in a
conclusory fashion that she does not
remember agreeing to, nor does she believe
that she agreed to, the specific forum
selection clause that is currently contained
within defendant’s Terms of Service.
However, screenshots of the sign-up page
containing a hyperlink to the website’s
Terms of Service, which includes the forum
selection clause (see id. Exs. A, B), and the
payment page containing hyperlinks to the
website’s Terms and Conditions of Purchase
and Supplemental Terms and Conditions of
Purchase (see id. Ex. C), corroborate the
process described by Burton. Moreover,
Burton stated that he reviewed defendant’s
subscription records, discerned the periods
of time during which plaintiff was a member
of the website, and confirmed that no
material changes to the website’s Terms and
Services were made during those periods.
(Id. ¶ 3.) Thus, it is clear that in order to
have obtained a JDate.com account, and in
order to have maintained that account
through various billing cycles, plaintiff
clicked the box confirming that she had both
read and agreed to the website’s Terms and
Conditions of Service (which included the
California forum selection clause), even
though she does not recall the specific terms
at this time. See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook,
Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y.

The Court must next consider whether
the fact that plaintiff agreed to the Terms of
Service indicates that defendant’s forum
selection
clause
was
reasonably
communicated to her. Several courts across
the United States have engaged in a
developing discussion of what conditions
and actions may manifest one’s assent to
contractual terms over the Internet. Thus, to
determine whether defendant’s clause was,
in fact, reasonably communicated to
plaintiff, the Court places this case on the
spectrum of such cases.
The Second Circuit has held that “a
consumer’s clicking on a [] button does not
communicate assent to contractual terms if
the offer did not make clear to the consumer
that clicking on the [] button would signify
assent to those terms.” Specht v. Netscape
Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). At issue in
Specht was an arbitration clause contained in
license terms on a website that plaintiffs
allegedly accepted when they downloaded a
plug-in program from the site. The Second
Circuit explained that when plaintiffs were
prompted to download free software from
the site at the click of a button, they could
not see a reference to any license terms that
they would be accepting by clicking. That is
because the sole reference to any license
terms was on a screen that the plaintiffs
could have only seen if they decided to
scroll down before first acting on the
8

Case 2:12-cv-03475-JFB-ARL Document 20 Filed 07/08/13 Page 9 of 21 PageID #: 106

conditions of use was made apparent to the
average user. A clickwrap agreement, by
contrast, requires a user to take more
affirmative action; the user must click an “I
agree” box after being presented with a list
of the terms and conditions of use in order to
receive access to a particular product. See
Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110,
130 n.18 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining the
difference
between
clickwrap
and
browsewrap agreements). Forum selection
clauses contained in clickwrap agreements
have been enforced by numerous courts
within this Circuit. See, e.g., Centrifugal
Force, Inc. v. Softnet Commc’n, Inc., 08 Civ.
5463 (CM)(GWG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20536, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2011);
TradeComet.com LLC I, 693 F. Supp. 2d at
377-78; Person v. Google Inc., 456 F. Supp.
2d 488, 496-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Novak v.
Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446,
451 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).

invitation to download. Id. at 31-32. Noting
that “there is no reason to assume that
viewers will scroll down to subsequent
screens simply because screens are there,”
the Second Circuit concluded that a
“reference to the existence of license terms
on a submerged screen is not sufficient to
place consumers on inquiry or constructive
notice of those terms,” and that the plaintiffs
could therefore not be said to have assented
to defendant’s arbitration clause when they
clicked to download the site’s plug-in
program. Id. at 32. However, the Court
noted that “contracts arising from Internet
use” have been found in situations where
there is “much clearer notice than in the
present case that a user’s act would manifest
assent to contract terms.” Id. at 33 (citing
cases).
Since Specht, courts have found such
“clearer notice” that Internet user actions
will amount to contractual assent in cases
involving
conspicuous
brosewrap
agreements and in cases involving clickwrap
agreements. In a browsewrap agreement,
‘“website terms and conditions of use are
posted on the website typically as a
hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.”’
Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (quoting Hines
v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362,
366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). A browsewrap
agreement “usually involves a disclaimer
that by visiting the website – something that
the user has already done – the user agrees
to the Terms of Use not listed on the site
itself but available only by clicking a
hyperslink.” Id. at 837. Several courts have
enforced browsewrap agreements where the
circumstances indicated that website users
‘“must have had actual or constructive
notice of the site’s terms, and have
manifested their assent to them,”’ id. at 836
(quoting Cvent, Inc. v. Eventbrite, Inc., 739
F. Supp. 2d 927, 937-38 (E.D. Va. 2010)),
i.e., whether the hyperlink to the terms and

In Fteja v. Facebook, the Southern
District of New York recently contemplated
a hybrid of a browsewrap and a clickwrap
agreement. 841 F. Supp. 2d 829. The court
described defendant Facebook’s Terms of
Use as “somewhat like a browseup [sic]
agreement in that the terms are only visible
via a hyperlink, but also somewhat like a
clickwrap agreement in that the user must do
something else – click ‘Sign Up’ – to assent
to the hyperlinked terms. Yet, unlike some
clickwrap agreements, the user can click to
assent whether or not the user has been
presented with the terms.” Id. at 838. In
determining whether Facebook’s Terms of
Use had been “reasonably communicated”
to plaintiff, given that consumers were
required to take further action not only to
assent to the terms, but also to view them,
the court considered relevant Supreme Court
and Second Circuit contract precedent
outside of the Internet context. The court
cited Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
9
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existence of, and need to accept and consent
to, the Terms and Conditions of Service was
readily
visible.
Moreover,
whereas
Facebook’s Terms of Use were referenced
below the button a prospective user had to
click in order to assent, defendant’s
reference to its Terms and Conditions of
Service appear above the button (id.),
thereby making it even more clear that
prospective members of JDate.com are
aware that by clicking the button to move
forward in the registration process, they
manifest their assent to the Terms and
Conditions of Service referenced above.

where the Supreme Court upheld a forum
selection clause on the back of a cruise
ticket even though the clause became
binding at the time of purchase, and the
purchasers only received the actual ticket
containing the clause later. 499 U.S. 585.
The court also referenced Effron v. Sun Line
Cruises, Inc., where the Second Circuit held
that the forum selection clause contained on
the back of a ticket bound plaintiffs at the
moment they accepted their tickets, even
though they had merely been referred to that
clause, rather than shown it, in promotional
materials that they received prior to their
purchase. 67 F.3d 7, 11 (2d Cir. 1995).
Based on these two non-Internet cases and
cases where pure browsewrap and pure
clickwrap agreements over the Internet were
enforced, the court reasoned that “clicking
the hyperlinked phrase [on Facebook’s
website] is the twenty-first century
equivalent of turning over the cruise ticket.
In both cases, the consumer is prompted to
examine terms of sale that are located
somewhere else.” Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at
839. Accordingly, the court held that
because plaintiff was “informed of the
consequences of his assenting click and he
was shown, immediately below, where to
click to understand those consequences,”
Facebook’s Terms of Use were “reasonably
communicated” for purposes of the Bremen
analysis. Id. at 840 (citing cases).

As to the fact that plaintiff had to click
on a hyperlink to view the Terms and
Conditions of Service (rather than view the
terms on the same page where she had to
indicate her assent to the terms), the Court
agrees with the Fteja court’s analogizing
this situation to cruise tickets – plaintiff was
shown precisely where to access the Terms
and Conditions of Service before she agreed
to them, and should have clicked on them in
the same way that one is expected to turn
over a ticket to learn of its terms. Moreover,
plaintiff was required to take two specific
actions to assent to JDate.com’s terms: (1)
check the box next to the statement “I
confirm that I have read and agreed to the
Terms and Conditions of Service” (with a
hyperlink to the Terms and Conditions of
Service over those words), and (2) click the
“Accept and Continue” button. (See id.)
Thus, plaintiff had to essentially “click” to
denote her acceptance of the Terms and
Conditions, which contained the forum
selection
clause,
twice.
In
such
circumstances, “[a] reasonably prudent
offeree would have noticed the link and
reviewed the terms before clicking on the
acknowledgement icon[s].” Fteja, 841 F.
Supp. 2d at 841 (quoting Guadagno v.

The instant case presents circumstances
that are quite analogous to those in Fteja v.
Facebook, and the Court strongly agrees
with the Fteja court’s analysis. Unlike the
license terms at issue in Specht, defendant’s
reference to its Terms and Conditions of
Service appear on the same screen as the
button a prospective user must click in order
to move forward in the registration process.
(See Burton Decl. Ex. B.) Plaintiff did not
need to scroll or change screens in order to
be advised of the Terms and Conditions; the
10

Case 2:12-cv-03475-JFB-ARL Document 20 Filed 07/08/13 Page 11 of 21 PageID #: 108

E*Trade Bank, 592 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (C.D.
Cal. 2008)) (alteration in original).6

enforce a clause that specifies only
jurisdiction in a designated court without
any language indicating that the specified
jurisdiction is exclusive.” (citation omitted)).
Additionally, the claims in this suit are
subject to the clause because the clause
governs “any and all claims by [user] arising
out of or related to the Websites” (Burton
Decl. ¶ 4). See, e.g., Salis, 331 F. App’x at
814 (finding that a clause that, by its terms,
applied to “[a]ny claim or dispute arising
under or in connection with” a particular bill
of lading applied to claims at issue in the
case, as those claims pertained to the bill).7

In sum, the Court concludes that plaintiff
assented to JDate.com’s Terms and
Conditions of Service, meaning that the
forum selection clause contained therein
was, in fact, reasonably communicated to
her.
As to the second and third steps of the
Bremen analysis, the Court concludes that
defendant’s forum selection clause is
mandatory, and that the claims in this
lawsuit are subject to the clause. The choice
of forum is mandatory in this instance
because specific language regarding venue
has been included in the clause, specifying
that “exclusive venue” for all claims is in the
“state and federal courts of the State of
California, City of Los Angeles” (Burton
Decl. ¶ 4 (emphasis added)). See, e.g., Salis
v. Am. Export Lines, 331 F. App’x 811, 813
(2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (“Whether a
forum selection clause is mandatory depends
on its language, and generally courts will not

Moreover, plaintiff has not met her
heavy burden of establishing that the
enforcement of defendant’s mandatory
forum selection clause, which was
reasonably communicated to her, would be
unreasonable. A clause is unreasonable if:
(1) its incorporation into the agreement was
the result of fraud or overreaching; (2) the
complaining party will be deprived of his
day in court due to the grave inconvenience
or unfairness of the selected forum; (3) the
fundamental unfairness of the chosen law
may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4)
the clause contravenes a strong public policy
of the forum state. Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s,
996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing
M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10, 15, 18 and

6

Moreover, the fact that plaintiff had to scroll
through the Terms and Conditions of Service after
she clicked on the hyperlink in order to get to the
provision containing the forum selection clause does
not affect the Court’s analysis. See, e.g., Scherillo v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 2d 313, 322
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that “[a] person who
checks the box agreeing to the terms and conditions
of a purchase on an internet site without scrolling
down to read all of the terms and conditions is in the
same position as a person who turns to the last page
of a paper contract and signs it without reading the
terms,” and thus concluding that “forum selection
clauses are ‘reasonably communicated’ to a webpage
user even where a user simply has to scroll down a
page to read the clause” (citing cases)); Feldman v.
Google, 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 237 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(“That the user would have to scroll through the text
box of the Agreement to read it in its entirety does
not defeat notice because there was sufficient notice
of the Agreement itself and clicking ‘Yes’ constituted
assent to all of the terms.”).

7

Nor is the clause’s application affected by the fact
that some of plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, and not
contract, because the viability of those claims depend
on the contract she entered into with defendant. See
Bluefire Wireless, Inc. v. CloudNine Comms., No. 09
Civ. 7268 (HB), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119009, at
*10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009) (“[A] forum selection
clause will also encompass tort claims if the tort
claims ultimately depend on the existence of a
contractual relationship between the parties, or if the
resolution of the claims relates to interpretation of the
contract, or if the tort claims involve the same
operative facts as a parallel claim for breach of
contract.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).

11
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signed.’” (quoting Sun Forest
Shvili, 152 F. Supp. 2d 367, 382
2001))). Plaintiff has therefore
show that the clause is in
unreasonable.

Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 59596). In all of her papers submitted to the
Court, plaintiff alleges neither that she will
be deprived of her day in court due to the
inconvenience of litigating this dispute in
California, nor that California law would
divest her of a remedy. In fact, in her
opposition papers, plaintiff states that she
“would prefer this case be heard in NY
state,” but that, “[i]n, the alternative, [sic]
the venue should be changed.” (Pl.’s Opp’n
at 1.)

Corp. v.
(S.D.N.Y.
failed to
any way

In sum, because the Court concludes that
defendant’s forum selection clause was
reasonably communicated to plaintiff, is
mandatory, governs the claims in this
lawsuit, and is not unreasonable, the clause
requiring claims to be brought in the State of
California, City of Los Angeles is valid and
enforceable.

Similarly, there is no indication or
credible evidence that defendant’s forum
selection clause was the result of fraud or
overreaching, or that its enforcement would
be against public policy under New York
law. To the extent that plaintiff suggests in a
conclusory fashion that she does not believe
that she agreed to be bound by the forum
selection clause, this Court has already
found that plaintiff did, in fact, knowingly
assent to defendant’s Terms and Conditions
of Service, which included the forum
selection clause. As a result, even if plaintiff
failed to read the terms she agreed to, she is
nevertheless bound by the forum selection
clause. See Paper Express, Ltd. v. Pfankuch
Maschinen GMBH, 972 F.2d 753, 757 (7th
Cir. 1992) (enforcing forum-selection clause
where plaintiff had not read the clause prior
to signing the contract because “it is a
fundamental principle of contract law that a
person who signs a contract is presumed to
know its terms and consents to be bound by
them”); see also Weingrad v. Telepathy,
Inc., 05 Civ. 2024 (MBM), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26952, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,
2005) (stating that a party was “bound by
the terms of the forum selection clause even
if he did not take the time to read it because
‘a signatory to a contact [sic] is presumed to
have read, understood and agreed to be
bound by all terms, including the forum
selection clauses, in the documents he or she

B. The Effect of Defendant’s Forum
Selection Clause
The effect of defendant’s valid and
enforceable forum selection clause on the
fate of this case depends on whether the
Court treats defendant’s motion as one for
dismissal or as one for transfer. If the case
should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(3),
the presence of a valid and enforceable
forum selection clause is determinative. If,
however, the case should be transferred
under Section 1404(a), defendant’s forum
selection clause is merely one factor – albeit,
a significant one – in the analysis. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court, in its
discretion, concludes that transfer pursuant
to Section 1404(a) is in the interest of
justice. Accordingly, defendant’s forum
selection clause factors significantly into the
transfer analysis, but is not determinative on
the question of whether the case should, in
fact, be transferred.
1. Applicable Law
When a plaintiff violates a valid forum
selection clause, either dismissal for
improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
transfer under Section 1404 is appropriate.
12
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most proper forum, should receive neither
dispositive consideration . . . nor no
consideration . . . but rather the
consideration for which Congress provided
in § 1404(a).”); Jones, 901 F.2d at 19
(“[T]he presence of a forum selection clause
[is] but one factor in the district court’s
consideration of fairness and convenience
under section 1404(a).” (citation omitted));
Longview Equity Fund, L.P. v. iWorld
Projects & Sys., Inc., No. 05 Civ.
6745(RJS), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25850,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008) (“Forum
selection clauses are properly considered as
an additional factor in a § 1404 analysis.”).
Thus, although the existence of a valid
forum selection clause may be a “significant
factor” in a court’s determination of whether
or not to transfer a case pursuant to Section
1404(a), it is not dispositive; in addition to
the presence of a valid forum selection
clause, a court contemplating transfer must
also consider the other discretionary factors
related to convenience and the interests of
justice. See Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at
29 (“The presence of a forum-selection
clause such as the parties entered into in this
case will be a significant factor that figures
centrally in the district court’s calculus [in
deciding a motion to transfer].”); Red Bull
Assocs. v. Best Western Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d
963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The existence of a
forum selection clause cannot preclude the
district court’s inquiry into the public policy
ramifications of transfer decisions.”).

“Whether dismissal or transfer is appropriate
lies within the sound discretion of the
district court.” Minette v. Time Warner, 997
F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing
Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d
779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The remedy
chosen determines how much weight is
given to the existence of a valid and
enforceable forum selection clause.
When a party argues that a case should
be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because
venue is improper, a valid forum selection
clause is controlling. See TradeComet.com
LLC II, 647 F.3d at 476-77 (explaining that
when a forum selection clause permits suit
in an alternative federal forum, a court may
enforce it under Rule 12(b)(3) and dismiss
the case); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17,
19 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that the
Bremen standard controls when “a party
seeks to have an action dismissed or
remanded to state court, rather than
transferred, on the basis of a forum selection
clause that purports to preclude litigation
from a venue other than a specific state
court”). Thus, if a party seeks to enforce a
valid forum selection clause via a Rule
12(b)(3) motion, a court may dismiss the
action. TradeComet.com LLC II, 647 F.3d at
478 (citing Langley v. Prudential Mortg.
Capital Co., LLC, 546 F.3d 365, 371 (6th
Cir. 2008) (Moore, J., concurring)); Phillips
v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 382 (2d
Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim through a Rule
12(b)(3) motion based on a forum selection
clause).

2. Analysis
Because defendant has moved to dismiss
this action or, in the alternative, to transfer
the case, the effect of defendant’s valid and
enforceable forum selection clause depends
on the remedy the Court elects.

Conversely, the presence of a valid
forum selection clause is but one aspect of a
court’s analysis of a Section 1404(a) transfer
motion. See Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at
28-31 (“The forum-selection clause, which
represents the parties’ agreement as to the

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff, in her
opposition papers, expresses a preference for
13
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justice.” (internal citation omitted)). But see,
e.g., Li Kin Wah v. Wu Hak Kong, No. 85
CIV 4454 (LBS), 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3877, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1987)
(“Several courts have held that an erroneous
but good faith filing in an improper venue
will toll the operation of the statute of
limitations.” (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent.
R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1965))).
Transferring this case ensures that plaintiff’s
timely filed complaint will be addressed,
whereas the claims might otherwise be time
barred if the case were dismissed. Finally, as
discussed in detail infra, after conducting
the transfer analysis required under Section
1404(a), the Court finds that transferring this
case would be in the interest of justice.

transfer, rather than dismissal, in the event
that the Court concludes that California
would be a proper venue for this action. (See
Pl.’s Opp’n at 1.) Although defendant has
expressed a preference for dismissal, it has
not argued that transfer would be
inappropriate. Instead, defendant has moved,
in the alternative, for transfer of this action
to the Central District of California.
In addition, given how attentive and
responsive plaintiff has been in this matter
thus far, the Court deems it likely that
plaintiff will simply re-file her claims in
California if they are dismissed by this
Court. Courts have found the “extra expense
and delay required if a case is dismissed
only to be refiled in another district to justify
transfer over dismissal.” See, e.g., AJZN,
Inc. v. Yu, 12-CV-3348-LHK, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2943, at *14-15 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
7, 2013) (citing cases); Rodriguez v.
PepsiCo Long Term Disability Plan, 716 F.
Supp. 2d 855, 862 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(“Dismissal would force Plaintiff to incur
additional fees and delay by refiling in the
Southern District of New York. The Court
therefore concludes that justice is best
served by transfer, rather than dismissal.”
(citing cases)). Moreover, it is unclear, from
the face of the complaint, whether the statute
of limitations for plaintiff’s claims has run.
In Minette v. Time Warner, the Second
Circuit exercised its “statutory and inherent
authority to transfer” a timely filed
complaint that the district court had
dismissed for improper venue, explaining
that because the statute of limitations had
run, plaintiff would be unable to have her
case heard if it was dismissed. 997 F.2d at
1026-27 (“Given that the functional purpose
of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is to eliminate
impediments to the timely disposition of
cases and controversies on their merits, the
transfer of this action, when the statute of
limitations has run, is in the interest of

For all of these reasons, the Court, in its
discretion, concludes that transfer, rather
than dismissal, is the appropriate remedy in
this instance.8 As a result, the existence of
defendant’s valid and enforceable forum
selection clause is but one factor in the
Court’s Section 1404(a) transfer analysis,
discussed in detail below.
A. Transfer Analysis
To determine whether transferring this
case would be in the interest of justice, the
Court must conduct a fact-specific inquiry.
As discussed supra, the forum selection
clause is a significant factor in favor of
transfer, however, “[t]he existence of a
forum selection clause cannot preclude the
[Court’s] inquiry into the public policy
8

The Court recognizes that the Second Circuit has
warned district courts not to “waste judicial resources
by transferring a case that is clearly doomed.” Daniel
v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 436 (2d
Cir. 2005) (quoting Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F.3d 609,
610 (7th Cir. 1999)). However, even if plaintiff’s
claims might be difficult to sustain, it does not appear
that they are “clearly doomed.” See, e.g., Person, 456
F. Supp. 2d at 498.
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means of the parties.”’ Fteja, 841 F. Supp.
2d at 832 (quoting N.Y. Marine and Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d
102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010)). However, there is
no strict formula for the application of these
factors, and no single factor is
determinative.
See,
e.g.,
Hilti
Aktiengesellschaft v. Milwaukee Elec. Tool
Corp., 04-CV-629 (ARR)(ASC), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16373, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. July
22, 2004). Instead, the factors should be
applied and weighed in the context of the
individualized
circumstances
of
the
particular case. Moreover, the moving party
has “[t]he burden of establishing the need
for a change of forum.” Wildwood Imps.,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2736, at *8 (citations
omitted).

ramifications of the transfer decision[].” Red
Bull Assocs., 862 F.2d at 967. For the
reasons discussed in detail below, having
analyzed the various “other factors relevant
to whether transfer would promote ‘the
convenience of parties and witnesses’ and
‘the interest of justice,’” Fteja, 841 F. Supp.
2d at 841 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)), the
Court concludes that transfer is warranted in
this instance.
1. Applicable Law
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been
brought.” In determining whether to transfer
venue, courts examine (1) whether the
action could have been brought in the
proposed forum, and (2) whether ‘“the
transfer would promote the convenience of
parties and witnesses and would be in the
interests of justice.”’ Clarendon Nat’l Ins.
Co. v. Pascual, No. 99 Civ. 10840
(JGK)(AJP), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2881,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2000) (quoting
Coker v. Bank of Am., 984 F. Supp. 757, 764
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)). “A motion to transfer
under § 1404(a) thus calls on the district
court to weigh in the balance a number of
case-specific factors.” Stewart Org., Inc.,
487 U.S. at 29.

2. Analysis
a. Whether This Action Could Have Been
Brought in the Central District of California
As a threshold matter, the Court must
determine whether this action could have
been brought in the Central District of
California. Diversity of citizenship forms the
basis for federal jurisdiction in this case. 28
U.S.C. § 1391(a) states that, in diversity
cases, venue is proper in:
(1) a judicial district where any
defendant resides, if all defendants
reside in the same State,

‘“Among the factors to be considered in
determining whether to grant a motion to
transfer venue are, inter alia: (1) the
plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the
convenience of witnesses, (3) the location of
relevant documents and relative ease of
access to sources of proof, (4) the
convenience of parties, (5) the locus of
operative facts, (6) the availability of
process to compel the attendance of
unwilling witnesses, and (7) the relative

(2) a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred, or a substantial part of
property that is the subject of the
action is situated, or
(3) a judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is
15
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the Court must next determine whether the
action should be transferred there. As
discussed supra, the Court has “broad
discretion” in this determination, and may
consider a number of factors relating to
convenience and the interests of justice. See
D.H. Blair & Co., 462 F.3d at 106 (“District
courts have broad discretion in making
determinations of convenience under
Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience
and fairness are considered on a case-bycase basis.”). As discussed in detail below,
the Court concludes that these factors, on
balance, weigh in favor of transfer.

commenced, if there is no district in
which the action may otherwise be
brought.
Additionally, under Section 1391(c), “a
defendant that is a corporation shall be
deemed to reside in any judicial district in
which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at
the time the action is commenced.” Plaintiff
does not dispute defendant’s assertion that
Spark Networks’ principal place of business
is central California. Therefore, Spark
Networks, the only defendant in this case,
“resides” in central California, and the
Central District of California is a
permissible venue under § 1391(a)(1) and
(c). See, e.g., Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v.
Roller Bearing Co. of Am., Inc., 99 Civ.
9133 (AGS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1623,
at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2001) (“This
action could have been brought in the
District of Connecticut because it is
undisputed that [defendant] has its principal
place of business in Fairfield, Connecticut.
Accordingly, the District of Connecticut
would have personal jurisdiction over
[defendant] and venue would be proper
under § 1391(a)(1) and (c) as to all of
[plaintiff’s] claims.”); Advance Relocation
& Storage, Inc. v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc.,
CV 99-2491 (DRH) (MLO), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19571, at *10-11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
15, 2000) (“In the instant case, venue in the
United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana is proper under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a)(1) because the judicial district is
one in which defendant, an Indiana
corporation with its principal place of
business in Indiana, resides, and all
defendants (there being only one) reside in
the same state, Indiana.”).

i. The Forum Selection Clause
As discussed in detail supra, the Court
concludes that defendant’s forum selection
clause – requiring any and all claims arising
out of or related to JDate.com to be brought
in the state and federal courts of the State of
California, City of Los Angeles – is valid
and enforceable. Thus, that the parties
agreed that the proper forum for this type of
action would be either the state or federal
courts of Los Angeles, California is a
“significant” factor in the Court’s analysis
weighing in favor of transfer. See Stewart
Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at 22, 28-31 (explaining
that although a valid and enforceable forum
selection clause is but one factor in the
district court’s Section 1404(a) analysis, it is
a “significant” one).
ii. The Locus of Operative Facts
To ascertain the locus of operative facts,
courts look to “the site of the events from
which the claim arises.” See 800-Flowers,
Inc. v. Intercontinental Florist, Inc., 860 F.
Supp. 128, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Defendant
argues that, in this case, “[t]he alleged
wrongful acts will undoubtedly focus on the
actions, if any, taken by Spark Networks’
employees related to Plaintiff’s JDate.com

b. Discretionary Factors
Because this action could have been
brought in the Central District of California,
16
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account and their alleged wrongful conduct
which led to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries.”
(Def.’s Mot. at 11.) Because Spark
Networks is headquartered in Los Angeles,
California, defendant contends that the locus
of operative facts relevant to the alleged
wrongful conduct at issue in this case is
necessarily based in that area. (Id.) The
Court agrees.

Internet, a breach alleged against those who
maintain such sites must occur where those
employees work); cf. Everlast World’s
Boxing Headquarters Corp. v. Ringside,
Inc., 12 Civ. 5297, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30128, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013) (“In
a contract case, the locus of operative facts
is determined by the location where the
contract was negotiated or executed, where
the contract was to be performed, and where
the alleged breach occurred.” (citation
omitted)). Thus, as between New York and
California, California is clearly the locus of
operative facts. See, e.g., Everlast World’s
Boxing Headquarters Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30128, at *27 (explaining that
plaintiff’s breach of contract “theory turns
on business activities among . . . defendants
that undisputedly occurred in Kansas, not
New York,” and that the “locus of operative
facts” factor, therefore, “emphatically favors
the District of Kansas”); Fteja, 841 F. Supp.
2d at 841-42 (explaining that employees
relevant to the claims in the case reside at
Facebook’s headquarters in Palo Alto, that it
can be said that the contract that was
allegedly breached was drafted in Palo Alto,
and that the alleged breach occurred in Palo
Alto); Abreu v. Family Shipping & Serv.,
00-CV-0284 (ILG), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5272, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2000) (“The
operative facts occurred in New Jersey . . . .
It appears that the only connections to New
York are that it was the place of initial
receipt of the [product at issue] and it is the
plaintiff’s residence.”).

The
individuals
who
allegedly
improperly billed plaintiff, and who plaintiff
allegedly spoke with about her issues with
the website, work outside of New York.9
Although plaintiff accessed the site and
called the Company from her home in New
York, that fact is not especially relevant to
defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct.
Instead, plaintiff’s claims will turn largely
on what Spark Employees did and what
motivated their actions. Those employees
are not located in New York, meaning that
the individuals from whom depositions will
likely need to be taken are not situated in
New York and neither are documents related
to the actions that they took.
Moreover, with respect to plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim in particular, the
alleged breach occurred outside of New
York (in California, by Spark Networks
employees who allegedly improperly billed
plaintiff). See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 842
(explaining that although discerning where a
contract was negotiated or executed and
where it was to be performed is difficult in
the case of social networking sites on the

iii. Convenience of Witnesses
9

Although defendant states that Spark Networks’
principal place of business is in Los Angeles, it does
not indicate whether all employees work at that
location. However, the Court, taking judicial notice
of Spark Networks’ website, concludes that all
employees of the company work outside the State of
New York. See http://www.spark.net/contact-usform/ (indicating that Spark Networks offices are
located in California, Utah, and Israel).

“The convenience of the forum for
witnesses is probably considered the single
most important factor in the analysis of
whether a transfer should be granted.” Ace
Am. Ins. Co. v. Bank of the Ozarks, 11 Civ.
3146 (PGG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
110891, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2012)
17
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locating a lawsuit in a particular forum.”
(internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)). Here, defendant has not identified
by name or by title any of its potential
witnesses, nor has it made a general
statement regarding their anticipated
testimony. Accordingly, although this factor
appears to favor defendant, it is not entitled
to substantial weight.

(citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Wagner v. N.Y. Marriott
Marquis, 502 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[T]he convenience of
both party and non-party witnesses is
probably the single-most important factor in
the analysis of whether transfer should be
granted.” (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted)). This factor would generally
favor transfer because the testimony of
Spark Networks employees – who work in
central California and who allegedly
improperly billed plaintiff and failed to
adequately respond to her complaints – will
most likely be the key testimony in the case.
Moreover, although the Central District of
California would invariably be more
inconvenient for plaintiff, “the courts of this
circuit have emphasized that a forum is not
necessarily inconvenient because of its
distance from pertinent parties or places if it
is readily accessible in a few hours of air
travel.” Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 843
(quoting Effron, 67 F.3d at 10) (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted).

iv. Location of Documents
With respect to the location of
documents, defendant has stated that
documents relevant to plaintiff’s claims are
located at its Los Angeles headquarters.
(Def.’s Mot. at 11.) Although this factor
therefore favors transfer, the Court does not
view it as particularly significant given that
we live in a technological age, where
electronic document production has become
the norm in litigation. See, e.g., Nat’l Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 12 Civ. 1250 (PKC) (RCE), 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 70206, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May
11, 2012) (“Less important in an era of
electronic documents, easy copying and
overnight shipping, the location of relevant
documents and sources of proof nonetheless
weighs in favor of transfer.” (alteration,
citation, and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. And
Indem. Ass’n, Inc. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc.,
474 F. Supp. 2d 474, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“The location of relevant documents is
largely a neutral factor in today’s world of
faxing,
scanning,
and
emailing
documents.”). Moreover, this factor is not
entitled to great weight because defendant
has not indicated that transporting
documents or other physical evidence from
California
would
be
particularly
burdensome. See, e.g., Larew v. Larew, 11
Civ. 5771 (BSG)(GWG), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2891, at * (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2012)
(“[T]he location of documents is entitled to

However, the Second Circuit has stated
that a party seeking to rely on the
“convenience of witnesses” factor “must
clearly specify the key witnesses to be called
and must make a general statement of what
their testimony will cover.” Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 218 (2d
Cir. 1978) (“When a party seeks the transfer
on account of the convenience of witnesses
under § 1404(a), he must clearly specify the
key witnesses to be called and must make a
general statement of what their testimony
will cover.”); see also Beatie & Osborn LLP
v. Patriot Scientific Corp., 431 F. Supp. 2d
367, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A party moving
to transfer on the ground that witnesses will
be inconvenienced is obliged to name the
witnesses who will be appearing and
describe their testimony so that the court
may measure the inconvenience caused by
18
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choice of venue is entitled to significant
consideration and will not be disturbed
unless other factors weigh strongly in favor
of transfer.” Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. United
States, 998 F. Supp. 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (citations omitted); see also Fteja,
841 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (“[B]ecause a court’s
discretion to transfer an action ‘must be
exercised at the very outset of the case,
when relatively little is known about how
the case will develop, courts have typically
accorded substantial weight to the . . .
plaintiff’s choice of forum.’” (quoting Atl.
Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc.,
603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))
(alteration in original)). However, courts
have noted that the weight given to this
factor is significantly diminished where, as
here, the operative facts did not occur in the
forum chosen by plaintiff. See, e.g., Capitol
Records, LLC v. VideoEgg, Inc., 611 F.
Supp. 2d 349, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(explaining that the emphasis placed on
plaintiff’s choice of forum diminishes where
the operative facts upon which the litigation
is brought bear little connection to the
chosen forum); Wagner, 502 F. Supp. 2d at
317 (“The presumption favoring plaintiff’s
choice of forum, however, is not so rigidly
applied where, as here, the cause of action
arose outside of that forum . . . .” (citation
and quotation marks omitted)).

little weight unless the movant makes a
detailed showing of the burden it would
incur absent transfer.” (alteration, citation,
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
v. Convenience of the Parties
The Court recognizes that “[w]here
transfer
would
merely
shift
the
inconvenience from one party to the other,’
the Court should leave plaintiff’s choice of
venue undisturbed.” Wagner, 502 F. Supp.
2d at 316 (quoting Wilshire Credit Corp. v.
Barrett Capital Mgmt. Corp., 976 F. Supp.
174, 182 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)). However,
where the parties have agreed upon a forum
in a forum-selection clause, as the parties
have done here, the convenience of the
parties factor generally weighs heavily in
favor of adjudicating the case in the chosen
forum. See, e.g., Falconwood Fin. Corp. v.
Griffin, 838 F. Supp. 836, 840 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (“In a case where the parties have
already agreed to a particular forum, the
‘convenience of the parties’ weighs heavily
in favor of hearing the case in the designated
court.”); Richardson Greenshields Secs.,
Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (“[T]he forum-selection
clause is determinative as to the convenience
of the parties.”). Moreover, although
plaintiff has stated that she would “prefer
this case be heard in NY State” (Pl.’s Opp’n
at 1), she has failed to articulate any
substantial inconvenience by having to
litigate this case in the Central District of
California, as opposed to in the Eastern
District of New York. This factor therefore
weighs strongly in favor of transfer.

Moreover, plaintiff’s choice of forum in
filing the lawsuit is not entitled to great
deference in this case because, as discussed
supra, there exists a valid and enforceable
forum selection clause that reflects an
earlier, contractually agreed upon choice of
forum by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Boehringer
Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Merial, Ltd.,
Civ. No. 3:09CV212 (AWT), 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6819, at *40 (D. Conn. Jan. 14,
2010) (“[A]s to the weight accorded the
plaintiff’s choice of forum, the court
concludes that this factor weighs heavily

vi. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum
It is well settled that the plaintiff’s
choice of forum is “given great weight.”
D.H. Blair & Co., Inc., 462 F.3d at 107
(citation omitted). Thus, “[a] plaintiff’s
19
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whether a party’s financial situation would
meaningfully impede its ability to litigate
this case in either forum.” (citation and
internal
quotation
marks
omitted)).
However, ‘“where proof of such disparity is
not adequately provided, or does not exist,
this is not a significant factor to be
considered.”’ Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 844
(quoting Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc. v. Tala
Bros. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 2d 474, 478
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)); see also Neil Bros. Ltd. v.
World Wide Lines, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d
325, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“A party arguing
for or against a transfer because of
inadequate means must offer documentation
to show that transfer (or lack thereof) would
be unduly burdensome to his finances.”
(citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).

against transfer because of the presence of a
valid and enforceable forum selection
clause, which the Supreme Court has
described as a ‘significant factor’ that should
figure centrally in the court’s analysis.”
(quoting Stewart Org., Inc., 487 U.S. at
29)); Ran-Mar, Inc. v. Wainwright Bank &
Trust Co., No. 2:08-cv-159, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 80167, at *8 (D. Vt. Oct. 9, 2008)
(“Ordinarily a valid contractual forum
selection clause will overcome deference to
a plaintiff’s choice of forum, because it is
‘treated as a manifestation of the parties’
preferences as to a convenient forum.’”
(quoting Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55
F.3d 873, 880 (3d Cir. 1995))); Strategic
Mktg. & Commc’ns, Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 41
F. Supp. 2d 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(“When a § 1404(a) motion involves a
forum selection clause and the language of
the clause is mandatory, rather than
permissive, deference to the plaintiff’s
choice of forum is inappropriate.”). Thus,
although plaintiff believes that venue should
remain in this District, a number of factors
weigh strongly in favor of transfer – namely,
the fact that the parties previously chose
California as the appropriate forum for cases
like this one through a valid and enforceable
forum selection clause, and that the locus of
operative facts is centered in California.

Plaintiff in this case is proceeding pro
se, and there appears to be a financial
disparity between the pro se plaintiff and her
corporate defendant. However, because
plaintiff has not provided any “information
demonstrating that [she] would be
financially prejudiced by having to litigate
in California, this factor adds nothing to
[the] analysis.” Quan v. Computer Scis.
Corp., CV 06-3927 (CBA)(JO), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1068, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,
2008); see also Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 844
(“Since the relative economic ability of the
parties to proceed with a case has rarely
been a dispositive reason to grant or deny a
venue change but is instead but one of
several factors for the court to consider, it
makes little sense to reject transfer on a
ground [plaintiff] has not advanced and
where the Court has no evidence in a case
where essentially all the other factors weigh
in favor of transfer.” (alteration, internal
citation, and internal quotation marks
omitted)). Thus, the relative means factor
does not tip the scale that, due to all of the

vii. Relative Means of the Parties
“Where a disparity exists between the
means of the parties, such as in the case of
an individual suing a large corporation, the
court may consider the relative means of the
parties in determining where a case should
proceed.” 800-Flowers, Inc., 860 F. Supp. at
135; see also AIG Fin. Prods. Corp. v.
Public Utility Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish
Cnty., Wash., 675 F. Supp. 2d 354, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In determining whether
the relative means of the parties weighs in
favor of transfer, a court should determine
20
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Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Defendant is
represented by David B. Gordon,
Richardson & Patel LLP, 750 Third Avenue,
9th Floor, New York, N.Y. 10017.

other factors mentioned above, strongly
weighs in favor of transfer.
***
In sum, after carefully considering the
parties’ submissions and the applicable law,
the Court concludes, in its discretion, that
the defendant has met its burden of
demonstrating that a balancing of the
transfer analysis factors, as well as the
totality of the circumstances and the
interests of justice, warrants transfer of this
action to the Central District of California.
Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence or
persuasive reason as to why transfer would
be improper. Accordingly, the Court grants
defendant’s motion to transfer the case.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
denies defendant’s motion to dismiss this
case and grants defendant’s motion to
transfer the proceedings. The Clerk of the
Court is directed to transfer this action to the
United States District Court for the Central
District of California, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a).
SO ORDERED.

______________________
JOSEPH F. BIANCO
United States District Judge
Dated: July 8, 2013
Central Islip, NY
***
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